“Peace and order are in the interests of every citizen” : elections, violence and state legitimacy in Kenya, 1957-74. by Willis,  Justin
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
24 August 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Willis, Justin (2015) 'Peace and order are in the interests of every citizen : elections, violence and state
legitimacy in Kenya, 1957-74.', International journal of African historical studies., 48 (1). pp. 99-116.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/ijahs/browse/?journal=ijahs
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  1 
 
“Peace and order are in the interest of every citizen”: 
elections, violence and state legitimacy in Kenya, 1957-74 
 
 
 
“I would like to appeal again to all the people of Kenya – of whatever tribe or 
area – to maintain the peace during the next few days and to ensure that this 
period passes by without violence or disorder”  
Sir Eric Griffiths-Jones, Acting Governor of Kenya, May 1963
1
 
 
“The Government will not tolerate any form of intimidation, political thuggery 
or any form of violence against any person or persons during the elections”  
President Jomo Kenyatta, November 1969
2
 
 
“Appealing for peace during next month’s parliamentary elections, [President 
Kenyatta] said that elections were proof to the world that Kenya was an 
outstanding example of democracy”3 
 
 
The calls for peace, which routinely accompanied elections in late colonial and early 
independent Kenya asserted a fundamental contrast: the ballot should be the antithesis of 
violence. That contrast – between violent disruption and the peaceful order of the election – 
was echoed in the bouts of self-congratulation following each of the six national (or near-
national) elections held in Kenya between 1957 and 1974. A 1974 post-election editorial, 
phrased with an interesting concern for external opinion, noted approvingly that  
 
The people have decided. And in the process of indicating their decision, the people of 
Kenya maintained their good image. They voted wisely and calmly, showing 
remarkable political maturity, respect for the law and for democracy.
4
  
 
Both pre- and post-election comments treated peace and order as synonyms, as well as 
evidence of electoral success. But neither the contrast between violence and elections, nor the 
association of peace and order, were entirely straightforward. As this essay will argue, 
violence was by no means entirely absent from any of these elections, and often appeared in 
the guise of order. Low-level violence was common, even endemic: the tearing of posters, 
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intimidatory stone throwing or window breaking, shouted threats, the beating of candidates or 
their agents. And violence featured in a more subtle way, too: in multiple ways, some more 
striking than others, elections were dramatic performances of discipline and regulation, which 
constrained some kinds of political choices and political behaviour while allowing others. 
These performances were linked – sometimes very apparently, sometimes in a more subtle 
way – to notions of legitimate violence.  
“Today, the relationship between the state and violence is an especially intimate one”, 
observed Max Weber, prefacing his argument that the distinguishing feature of “the state” is 
its “(successful) claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”5 His words 
suggest a certain wry weariness suitable to the Europe of 1919, but might also seem apposite 
for the late-colonial and post-colonial state in Africa. The assertion of a singular regime of 
violence was, after all, central to the idea of the rule of law that, as Richard Roberts and 
Kristin Mann have argued, “powerfully legitimized colonial rule” in Africa.6 But as Gregory 
Mann has shown for French West Africa, the idea of an “empire of law” co-existed uneasily 
with a “regime of exceptions”, in which violence could be commonplace and effectively 
extra-legal.
7
 In Kenya, the ideal of a state monopoly of violence regulated by law came up 
against the extra-legal use of violence (whether by white settlers, chiefs’ retainers, or labour 
recruiters) with uncomfortable frequency. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale have suggested 
that officials in Kenya engaged in a lengthy struggle to replace “private oppression with state 
sanctions,” in order to maintain the legitimacy of colonial authority.8 The challenge to 
colonial power (and to other kinds of power as well) posed by the Mau Mau insurgency of 
the 1950s tipped the balance in this struggle. The violence of the insurgents led directly to a 
massive increase in the resourcing of state violence – more police, more soldiers, more 
hangings, more prisons. And it led also to a particularly bloody period of extra-legal violence. 
Much of this was sub-contracted to the more or less informal auxiliaries of a vicious anti-
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insurgency campaign; some was the work of administrators and police themselves.
9
 Some 
25,000 people died as a direct result of this spasm of violence, which profoundly marked 
independent Kenya, inflecting all relationships between people and government, asserting yet 
at the same time threatening the very notion of legitimate violence.
10
 Elsewhere in eastern 
Africa, multiple conflicts arose after independence. In Kenya,  by contrast, the post-
independence period saw a determined and largely consistent campaign to contain and 
manage violent conflict through the colonial administrative structures -  provincial 
commissioner, district commissioners, district officers. These had been given unusual 
robustness and status by the policy of ‘closer administration’ developed in response to 
insurgency; soon after independence, Presidential Circular Number 1 of 1965 had reaffirmed  
that status, effectively giving administrative officers authority over all other branches of 
government. 
That Kenya’s new rulers maintained many of the institutional structures and attitudes 
established by their colonial predecessors is well attested. For a new cohort of Kenyan 
administrators, the assertion that only they could authorise legitimate violence was just as 
important as it had been to their British predecessors. But they too struggled both to make 
real that monopoly, and to stay within the bounds of the law. The campaign against the Shifta 
separatists of northern Kenya involved so much extra-legal violence that an extraordinary law 
was passed indemnifying police, soldiers and administrators against responsibility for their 
actions – in direct imitation of the 1955 double amnesty which had offered similar protection 
to those involved in the campaign against Mau Mau.
11
 The decade after independence was 
punctuated by a series of assassinations; the murders of Pio Gama Pinto in 1965, Tom Mboya 
in 1969 and J. M. Kariuki in 1975, have never been fully explained, but it was widely 
assumed that all were linked to senior figures in the government.
12
 The use of extra-legal 
violence, and the derogation of violence to others, was very much feature of Kenya in the 
1960s and 1970s. But politicians and administrators were uneasily aware of the dangers of 
this. The toleration, or encouragement, of extra-legal violence undermined the central claim 
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to legitimacy which was embedded in what one historian has called “the ideology of order”.13 
While David Anderson and Oystein Rolandsen have argued that “violence was used as a 
principal instrument in the creation and consolidation of the authority of the state in eastern 
Africa”, it is important to remember that authority required also the management and 
containment of that violence.
14
 In these circumstances, elections provided a means by which 
to both assert and debate the linkage between peace, order and legitimate authority. 
Scholarly emphasis on the performative nature of stateness is now almost banal; the 
exercise of power often relies on ritual display. This may be understood simply as an exercise 
by “the state” to overawe the populace, or more subtly as a ‘state effect’ – part of a framing 
process through which the “uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is 
produced”: an element in creation of the illusion of a binary order which is basic to the 
modern political order.
15
 Violence, or rather the manifestation of the possibility of violence, 
has played a prominent part in such performance. Guns, uniforms and flags tend to be 
prominent elements in ritual, and the conscription of a wider populace as an audience to 
military parades and displays – passive consumers of the performance of euphemized 
violence – has been commonplace as a technique for authorizing power.16  
This article will argue that the relationship between violence and performance can take 
less obvious form, and may be complex. Those rituals which are most effective in 
constructing stateness are those which demand – or even better, elicit – the direct 
involvement of the populace as performers rather than simply as audience; in doing so, of 
course, they open up space for popular involvement in shaping these performances.
17
 
Elections by secret ballot - which offer a moment of political choice in return for 
participation – are perhaps the most striking of such inclusive rituals, disciplining people into 
citizenship.
18
 “Polling-booth fetishism”, as some have called it, is the corollary of this: 
politicians, governments, international organizations and journalists all set enormous store by 
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the performative processes of elections, and the absence of large-scale violence during these 
processes is treated as a sign of democratic success.
19
 
Analyses of the political stability of Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s have argued that that 
this was a bureaucratic-executive system, combining coercion with patronage and reliant on 
the continuity provided by an administrative class; but they have also emphasised the 
importance of participation.
20
 This article draws on these insights to suggest that elections 
helped to routinize ideas about legitimate and illegitimate violence, and particularly about the 
legitimacy of ordering, systemic violence. These ideas underwrote the political dispensation, 
but they also cleared space for debate about the relationship between violence and legitimacy. 
As Cherry Gertzel argued at the time, this was a period in which the civil service (and in 
particular the system of provincial administration), whose dominance had been briefly 
challenged by the politics of independence, reasserted its dominance in Kenya’s political 
system.
21
 Yet, there was a degree of uncertainty and contest over the exact terms of that 
dominance, which were revealed partly through these debates over elections and violence. 
While Kenya’s elections may be seen as events of “elite consolidation”, as Goran Hyden and 
Colin Leys put it, they were by no means entirely scripted or uncontested.
22
  
 
The first triumph of the system? 
Daniel Branch’s seminal article on Kenya’s 1957 election suggests that violence lay at 
the heart of this ostensibly peaceful process.
23
 Conceived by the colonial authorities as a way 
to manage African expectations, and to provide political space for African leaders who were 
willing to work with the state, the election was founded on the processes of systematic 
incarceration, exclusion and execution, through which the Mau Mau insurgency had been 
suppressed. Property and “loyalty” qualifications ensured a franchise which was narrow in 
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most of Kenya, and vanishingly small in the central highlands; campaigning was so 
circumscribed as to be meaningless in much of the country; there were no parties, and the 
words and actions of every candidate were closely monitored.
24
 Candidates were not even 
permitted to broadcast on the radio, lest they make “irresponsible and misleading 
statements”.25 British reports on the ballot itself noted approvingly that “polling has gone 
well, and no incidents have been reported”: but this election was inextricably linked with 
violence, and was intended to authorise it.
26
 As Branch has, ironically, noted, this first 
election provided “a precedent for the reproduction of state authority through the 
manipulation of elections” which post-independence governments were to follow.27  
In terms of immediate electoral outcomes, however, the result was not quite what the 
British had hoped for. The elected African representatives denounced both the Lyttleton 
Constitution, with its strictly communal notion of representation, and the hastily-contrived 
alternative of the Lennox-Boyd Constitution. Instead, they pressed for adult suffrage. The 
rapidity with which the British government acceded to that demand, leading to independence 
only six years after the 1957 poll, owed more than a little to the sense that that elections were 
a way to “encourage coherence and discipline in African politics . . . [and] break the habit of 
violence”, as the electoral expert William Mackenzie put it – by which, of course, he meant 
violence which was not authorised.
28
 Mackenzie’s call for rapid progress to universal 
suffrage seemed premature to some when he first made it in 1959; within two years, it had 
become commonplace. 
In the course of this rush to independence, a second election was held in 1961. It was 
in many ways very different to that of 1957. Now there were national African parties, KANU 
(Kenya African National Union) and KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) in direct 
competition with one another; and there was open campaigning. While the franchise was still 
nominally a qualified one, the enthusiasm of the administration for the process of registration, 
and the difficulty of applying the qualifications, meant that it is likely that a majority of the 
adult population were registered.
29
 Registration, like voting, was itself a disciplinary process 
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– the largest in scale of the “modern, microphysical methods of order” asserting the 
distinctiveness of “the state”.30 And while campaigning was freer than it had been in 1957, 
meetings of more than fifty people still required a licence, with the names of speakers 
approved in advance and the lyrics of any songs subject to prior vetting.
31
 
The intensity of the rivalry between KADU and KANU has been the subject of much 
study, as too has the general partiality of the colonial administration for KADU.
32
 It was a 
rivalry which manifested itself in a number of incidents of petty violence associated with the 
“youth wingers” recruited by each party. In the face of apparent anxieties over a possible 
wider breakdown of authority, the government announced that it ‘would not hand over its 
responsibility for governing the country and for maintaining law and order to any political 
group or party.’ Violence, and the threat of violence, was swiftly and demonstratively 
repressed by the security forces.
33
 In Nyanza, the Provincial Intelligence Committee reported 
that although there had been no actual clashes between youth wingers “recent police action ... 
. has resulted in the arrest and conviction of a number of ODINGA youth wingers”; in 
Nairobi “police action” to repress disorder “resulted in the disappearance from the City of 
several leading thugs who showed no desire to clash with the Police”; and in Nakuru police 
raided party offices and seized what they described as “armouries” of home-made weapons.34 
For the election itself, the security services bared their teeth a little further, through the 
deployment of soldiers and paramilitaries, as well as increased police patrols.
35
 Even 
KANU’s post-election celebrations were contained by a determined show of force. In 
Nairobi,  
Cheering crowds thronged the streets, but were watched by squads of police and of the 
paramilitary General Service Unit. Armed with rifles and batons, they were determined 
to contain Nairobi East. Barring the approach roads to the centre of Nairobi, they 
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prevented the spread of the rejoicing, and used tear gas twice during the night to 
disperse the crowds.
36
 
The polls themselves were again free from violence: as one typical report (from Rift Valley 
Province) put it “the elections were conducted peacefully, and very few untoward incidents 
were reported.” From London, the secretary of state wrote approvingly of the “orderly 
elections”.37 
It was not only the colonial administration - and the security forces working under its 
direction - that used the 1961 election to emphasise the distinction between those kinds of 
violence that were authorised, and those that were not. African politicians themselves were 
drawn into this practice, even as they also recruited and paid youth wingers:  
Mr James Gichuru, president of the Kenya African National Union, said the world was 
waiting to see if Kenya Africans were able to conduct their campaigns and cast votes as 
responsible adult citizens. Their enemies would be very pleased to see Africans 
“fighting or causing strife either by words or with weapons, stones or fists” so that they 
could claim that Africans were not ready to go forward on the road to self-
government…. 38 
An intelligence report noted approvingly that KANU candidates were “openly and actively 
condemning any violence.” This was presumably made easier by the “rigorous Police action” 
to suppress “domineering thugs” from KANU’s youth wing which the same source 
reported.
39
 In calling for peaceful elections, and denouncing the violence of others as they 
sought to delegitimize their opponents, both KANU and KADU effectively acknowledged the 
monopoly of legitimate violence, and the logic that defined acceptance of the political order 
as peace. As an observer noted, commenting on the “remarkable” lack of violence in the 
campaign: “Two factors had restrained the feared violence: a large and efficient police force 
and the control exercised by party leaders.”40 
Two years later, Kenya returned to the polls again, with another new constitution, and 
this time with formal universal adult suffrage, and without communal representation. The 
1963 election was the direct preliminary to self-government, and again the principal 
competition was between KADU – now committed to a policy of regional devolution – and 
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KANU, which advocated strongly centralised government. A third party, the African 
People’s party (APP) was in loose alliance with KADU and actively hostile to KANU. There 
was widespread concern over the possibility of violence between the parties; there was also a 
pervasive background anxiety over the future of the political system itself.
41
 The survival of 
the structures created by colonialism, which is apparent in retrospect, was by no means so 
assured for observers at the time. The elections (there were several, for multiple levels of 
government) were the final governmental performance of the colonial state, and the police 
and administration threw themselves into the task with extraordinary energy, using all the 
resources at their disposal to create a display of order in which uniformed officers played a 
central role: “the voters have to be organized into queues outside the precincts of the polling 
station, and I suggest that this duty is best performed by others than the purely election 
officials, that is to say Chiefs, Sub-chiefs, Police and Tribal Police.”42 The extravagant 
language of control, and the display of uniforms, was coupled with a willingness to use force 
wherever order seemed challenged, as a government spokesman emphasised: “the 
Government wishes to state its firm intention to maintain law and order and prevent 
intimidation. Firm action will be taken against private individuals who take the law into their 
own hands.”43 
  
During the campaign, and over the several days of polling, tear gas and baton charges 
were repeatedly used to prevent “disorder”: five such incidents occurred in the town of 
Nakuru alone during the seven days of the polls.
44
 And the restraining hand of the security 
services was also ready to contain any manifestation of disorder, as in Nairobi where “[t]hree 
times the voters broke down the gates of a school set up as a polling station in their 
eagerness, but they were soon brought into orderly lines by the police standing by with riot 
trucks and mounted police.”45 
 
The contending parties were drawn further into the creation of this order. All parties 
recruited “youth wingers”, and at a local level there was an evident and widespread 
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willingness to use violence to intimidate candidates or supporters of other parties.
46
 But the 
leaders of the parties trod a delicate line – because all were, ultimately, committed to 
upholding the authority of a system that they hoped to inherit. And so they accused their 
opponents of unauthorised violence, and sought to call down upon them the power of state 
coercion as the price for controlling their own supporters.
47
 Following an attack on KANU 
supporters by APP supporters, the two parties traded accusations and demands for 
government action: “Failing prompt action by the authorities I will not be in a position to 
restrain my supporters”, one APP politician asserted, his KANU rival responding by accusing 
the APP’s leader of condoning violence: “I think it is absolutely disgusting for a man like 
Ngei [of the APP] who calls himself a national leader.”48 Kenyatta, leader of KANU, issued a 
statement to the press asserting the legitimacy of governmental order: 
 
I call upon all voters to remain calm during this period and to refrain from any act of 
hooliganism. 
I remind the people that the officers of the police and of the administration are serving 
under a Government which is about to come under the control of Kanu. You should 
therefore give those officers every assistance because when the elections are over they 
will be working for your own government.
49
 
 
Police and administrators took the opportunity to mark clearly the difference between 
authorized and unauthorized violence, asserting the primacy of their claims to order: “Eight 
uniformed Kanu followers were arrested at Nyamira, Kisii, on Saturday when they tried to act 
as stewards at a polling station.”50 In the aftermath of the elections, the Kenya government 
and press both declared their success in statements which once again conflated peace and 
order: local administrators reported that “elections on the whole were very peaceful and 
highly successful,” while the council of ministers congratulated the supervisor of elections 
for his “magnificently successful achievement in organizing and controlling the elections.”51 
 
Violence in the “little general election” 
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KANU won the election of 1963, and formed the government that led Kenya to 
independence at the end of the year. Less than a year later, KADU was dissolved, its leaders 
joining KANU – in effect turning Kenya into a one-party state. But in 1966, KANU 
fractured, with a ‘radical’ group of MPs leaving the party to form the Kenya People’s Union 
(KPU). A swift change in the law led to their expulsion from parliament and the calling of 
by-elections in their constituencies. Though this affected only 29 of the 129 elected seats in 
parliament, this ‘little general election’ was seen as a crucial test for the government. 
It is likely that there was outright rigging in the subsequent poll, with ballot boxes 
stuffed or destroyed.
52
 But a more fundamental factor in the ensuing KANU victory was what 
Susanne Mueller has termed “statism”. The government possessed a “monopoly of coercive 
sanctions and resources”, which it used ruthlessly to defeat the KPU challenge.53 KPU 
supporters lost their jobs, or their cars; KPU branches were refused registration; KPU 
meetings were refused licences; and KPU politicians were refused permission to campaign in 
parts of northern Kenya where insurgency had led to travel restrictions. The official radio 
station played the KANU anthem, “KANU builds the country”; ministers used state resources 
to campaign, and spoke to audiences marshalled for them by the administration.
54
 The army 
was not usually deployed to ensure internal order (except in the Shifta conflict): that was 
always the task of the administration, which directly controlled the administration police (as 
the former ‘”tribal police” were now known), and had a substantial degree of authority over 
the regular police. But in 1966 the army was ordered to stage demonstrative parades in 
Nyanza, the KPU heartland. The language was unambiguously aggressive: as a newspaper 
headline put it, “It’s war, says Kenyatta”.55 The murder of Pio Gama Pinto the previous year, 
and physical attacks on KPU candidates, made clear that opposition politicians ran a very 
direct personal risk.
56
 KANU leaders were explicit in their threat to deny state patronage to 
areas which were so unwise as to elect KPU MPs: “I am sure the voter will remember that he 
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is voting for his future, for the future of his children and for the future of the area from which 
he comes. No one would like to see his area left behind.”57 
On one level, this reflected an intensification of the practices established by late 
colonialism – like the 1957 election, this was a display of order to underwrite a particular 
political dispensation. But in 1966 the display was overtly partisan, and the commitment to 
peace evidently contingent. KANU youth wingers were repeatedly, and openly, used to 
intimidate and coerce.
58
 This was often in collusion with the administration, and therefore 
with the police: KANU youth-wingers would disrupt KPU rallies with stone-throwing and 
shouting; the police would then obligingly disperse the rally to end the violence.
59
 At other 
times, politicians and their youth wingers acted directly against KPU, while the police stood 
by.
60
 In the months following the election, KPU was subject to continued harassment by 
KANU youth wingers. In the wake of one violent attack on KPU officers, a district officer 
(DO) complacently reported that  
The incident at Ng’ombeni on 12/11/67 when the KANU coup the KPU office [sic] 
didn’t really cause some threat to security. The KPU knowing they only number from 
1-10 didn’t resist the coup. An indication that they haven’t got any strength in the 
division.
61
 
The DO went on to note that “I asked nearly all my chiefs to issue an order in respect of 
unlawful meetings. Any meetings without permission must be dealt with. KANU held their 
meetings at Ng’ombeni on 12/11/67 and Tiwi on 13/11/67.” Administrative coercion was still 
important, and it would be apparent again in the near-farcical 1968 local-government 
elections, where many KPU candidates were simply disqualified on technical grounds.
62
 But 
violence was also being vulgarized with official connivance, reversing the performative 
message of previous elections. 
 
“Intimidation will not be permitted”: containing electoral violence 
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The process of decision-making and debate within Kenya in these years remain opaque 
– to put it mildly – but the possible dangers of this were evidently recognised by at least some 
politicians and administrators. When, in 1969, Kenya’s first parliament was finally dissolved, 
the language and practices of the ensuing election saw a determined effort by the civil 
servants who ran Kenya’s system of provincial administration to assert a monopoly of 
legitimate violence, and to display their pre-eminence over the party.  
Dissolution had followed a series of dramatic events. The murder of Tom Mboya, a 
leading KANU politician from western Kenya, followed three months later by the shooting 
dead of a number of demonstrators – KPU supporters – in western Kenya in the course of a 
disastrous presidential visit had displayed very publicly the potential for extra-legal violence, 
authorised by those at the heart of government. The KPU was banned after the shootings, and 
its leaders taken into preventive detention. The election took place in the shadow of this 
defining act of coercion: a newspaper front page juxtaposed a list of candidates, a photograph 
of police removing the furniture from the KPU main office, and a report that government 
would  
guarantee freedom of choice, ensure security at the elections, reaffirm that the 
Government will deal seriously with anyone intimidating or interfering with election 
procedure and generally give Kenyans a policy of freedom of election.
63
  
 
It is unclear how intentional the irony was. But despite the suppression of the KPU, it is 
evident that a decision was taken that a degree of choice should be allowed in the election, 
and that the administration and police should try to prevent acts of violence – other than those 
committed by themselves. Reported statements by Kenyatta suggest a profound concern with 
international opinion, “’No violence’ warning by president”, declared one newspaper 
headline.
64
 Another article noted that 
[Kenyatta] urged the nation towards a peaceful election ‘to prove to the world that 
Kenya is a civilised and peaceful country’ ... ‘If we conduct our elections peacefully we 
shall form another peaceful Government which will do wonderful things for the 
people.’65 
 
And on the day of the election itself it was announced that  
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President Kenyatta’s ‘most fervent wish, as the country goes to polls to elect the 
country’s second parliament since independence, is that peace, tranquility and fair play 
will be unquestionably maintained.’66 
 
The same point was made by a KANU spokesman 
 
A great deal now depends – in terms of Kenya’s domestic well-being and international 
prestige – on this election being conducted in a dignified and peaceful manner.67 
 
The national press, which self-consciously sought both to display loyalty to the government 
and to maintain the long-term stability of the political system, repeatedly urged the 
importance of voting: “As it turns out there is much that each voter can do with his vote, and 
we need not lose the excitement of a general elections [sic] though there is only one political 
party in the field.”68 Another editorial anxiously argued the need for order, as “a few 
unpalatable incidents are likely to be more noticeable in the outside world and may give 
Kenya a bad name.”69 
 
The extent of choice involved in this ordered contest should not be overstated. The 
president and vice-president faced no contest in their parliamentary seats, and there was never 
any suggestion of a presidential challenge – Kenyatta was the only candidate nominated and 
was returned unopposed.
70
 Various candidates were barred from standing, allegedly on 
technical grounds but quite evidently in some cases for political reasons.
71
 But there was 
competition in the great majority of parliamentary seats. 
 
This was ensured by a curious arrangement in which the election itself involved no 
voting: votes were cast only in what were formally KANU primary elections, which produced 
a single candidate for each seat. The primary elections, however, were run not by the party 
but by the administration – partly because of the organizational weakness of the party but 
also as a very direct demonstration of the dominance of the administration: this was the final 
act in the prolonged struggle identified by Gertzel, over “who should control the state: the 
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bureaucracy or the party.”72 All registered voters were allowed to participate, in return for a 
spoken assurance that they supported KANU.
73
 The consequence was that significant 
numbers of sitting MPs and ministers lost their seats.
74
 Less noted has been the way that the 
election offered an opportunity to assert that “peace” was defined through a spatial and 
temporal order approved by the administration.  
 
This assertion was made constantly in speeches and press announcements, and acted 
out physically in the performances of the election. Repeated calls were made for a “peaceful 
election”: “The Government will not tolerate any form of intimidation, political thuggery or 
any form of violence against any person or persons during the elections.”75 Kenyatta himself 
emphasised this in a speech to KANU parliamentarians.
76
 Candidates were required to hold 
joint campaign meetings superintended by a senior police officer and an administrator. One 
provincial commissioner (PC) emphasised the “importance of maintaining law and order 
during elections”, while another announced that “[d]uring the elections the Government will 
expect orderliness as any act of lawlessness or intimidation will not be permitted.”77 There 
were numerous arrests for campaign-related violence. Pressing for conviction in one such 
case, a police officer told the court that “the authorities concerned with the maintenance of 
law and order are particularly cautious at election time to see that no violence or intimidation 
were used.”78 The press announced that “[s]quads of specially trained police officers and 
specially briefed junior officers” had been deployed “to attend election campaign meetings 
and see that there is no interference with law and order.”79 
 
Youth wingers were a particular concern: one PC “gave a stern warning to youth 
wingers against allowing themselves to be used to cause trouble. He said that Government 
would be very firm to ensure that there was peace and that law and order was maintained 
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throughout the elections.”80 The message was repeated by one of KANU’s most prominent 
young politicians, Mwai Kibaki:  
‘Youth wingers must be told that they are supposed to campaign for the candidates of 
their choice peacefully. They must not resort to personal attacks on their opponents or 
disfigure the posters of their opponents’81 
 
 Neither these instructions, nor the accompanying police action, were entirely effective: there 
was disruption and low-level violence.
82
 Some may have been organized by candidates, in 
defiance of the warnings. But some of the heckling and jeering and tearing of posters was 
surely also evidence simply of popular opinion: hostility to particular candidates who had 
failed to meet previous promises, perhaps a rejection of the disciplinary demands of the 
election. A large meeting in Nairobi had to be dispersed by the police when the district 
commissioner (DC) was reportedly unable to “calm crowds which went into hysterical 
singing.” At another Nairobi meeting, candidates sharing a joint platform had to speak from 
inside a ring of police officers as “as rival groups tried to outsing each other.”83  
 
Yet, by the end of the campaign the KANU election coordinator was claiming that 
“the election campaign had now reached a state of total calm and orderliness,” while the press 
editorialised that “[p]erhaps the most remarkable aspect of Kenya’s first general election 
since independence is the orderliness – the peace and dignity – with which polling was done 
at the weekend.”84 A British diplomat echoed this verdict.85 The 1969 election was one in 
which the notion of a monopoly of legitimate violence was vigorously reasserted: this was 
“elite consolidation”, but it was consolidation around a particular idea of the state, and it 
demanded acceptance of specific rules of behaviour.  
 
The last election of the Kenyatta period came in 1974. As in 1969, this was a single-
party election, in which all candidates had to be approved by the ruling party. Once again, the 
provincial administration ran the election, although it was nominally under the control of the 
supervisor of elections. The calmer tone of the press coverage suggests a more assured sense 
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of the stability of the system. The now-practised techniques of control and exclusion were 
used again: Kenyatta was the only nominated presidential candidate; former KPU leaders, 
though now out of detention, were excluded from standing for parliament by carefully-
phrased regulations; some candidates were permitted to brazenly use harambee (self-help 
fund-raising events) to campaign, while others were forbidden to do so; and the most 
outspokenly radical candidate, J. M. Kariuki, was prevented from campaigning, with officials 
simply refusing to licence his meetings.
86
  
This ban attracted only brief mention in the press, though it was the subject of much 
popular discussion. An emerging intra-elite dispute within KANU also received little press 
coverage. The growing influence of Daniel arap Moi, who had been vice-president since 
1967, was made apparent by his unchallenged passage through the nomination process, and 
by the very public criticism by the national press of his principal rival in national politics, 
Njoroge Mungai – who was defeated at the polls, and whose political career never 
recovered.
87
 
Behind these dramas was continuing debate over the nature of legitimate violence. 
The avoidance of disorder was emphasised again: “President Kenyatta yesterday called for 
calm during the forthcoming Parliamentary elections.”88 The vice-president spelled the 
message out more fully: “The Government has decided to deploy its forces of law and order 
to protect the lives of its people and ensure that the elections will be conducted in an 
atmosphere of peace and stability.” Another senior politician announced that, “[t]he stability 
and security of the country must be protected at all costs. It is imperative that Kenyans show 
maturity and dignity at this time of uncertainty.”89 Youth wingers were again singled out as a 
particular problem, and there were arrests of those who disrupted meetings. The enforcement 
of order was extended to warnings against defacing the posters of other candidates, and one 
DC even announced that “shouting against candidates will not be permitted.”90 Joint 
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campaign meetings were no longer required, though the candidates in Nairobi were 
summoned to discuss their campaign plans with the PC, and in some places joint meetings 
were held – as in Kikuyu, where the police actually prevented the audience from leaving until 
they had heard all the candidates speak.
91
 When an encounter between the motorcades of two 
candidates in Nairobi led to one of the candidates firing warning shots, the administration 
responded swiftly: meetings were temporarily banned, and the candidate was arrested and 
convicted – on the relatively minor charge of having allowed his firearm licence to expire, 
but the warning was clear. As the PC put it: “It is for the good of the country, and its citizens, 
that campaign meetings or any other gatherings are conducted peacefully.”92 The press 
editorialised in support of this, calling for “peace and order” and announcing that “there is a 
need for every responsible citizen not only to exercise good conduct on his part but also to 
enjoin others to follow his example.”93 
 
But the 1974 election was not simply an occasion for the display of the power of the 
administration. In modest but significant ways, both politicians and other parts of the civil 
service sought to rein in what they saw as excesses by the provincial administration and the 
police. There was an interesting spat between a PC and the supervisor of elections, eventually 
won by the supervisor, over the role of candidates’ agents and over the PC’s suggestion that 
voters who did not look obviously “African” would be required to bring proof of citizenship, 
as well as their registration card, in order to be allowed to cast their ballot.
94
 Most striking 
was the aftermath of an incident at Kaptumo in which an election rally was dispersed by tear-
gas and batons. This led to very public criticism of the police and administration by Moi.
95
 
The press supported Moi, “with the approaching general elections . . . the whole nation is 
counting on Kenya’s police force to maintain peace and order,” explained the Daily Nation, 
but peace and order were actually endangered by “hasty decisions” like that to disperse the 
rally. The newspaper repeated the linkage between electoral order and legitimacy: “[p]eace 
and order are in the interest of every citizen, be he a policeman, a Government official or an 
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ordinary citizen ...The part which each person plays in this respect will be a major 
contribution to the nation’s image both here and abroad”; as the campaign progressed, the 
press continued to report politicians’ criticisms of excessive use of force by the police and 
administration.
96
 How far such criticism moderated the behaviour of police and 
administrators is not clear, but when the polls were over, the 1974 election was – like its 
predecessors – judged to be both peaceful, with violence either restricted to its fringes or so 
embedded in its processes as to be invisible. Once again, Kenyatta thanked the public for 
‘conducting themselves peacefully’, and with some satisfaction a British diplomat observed 
that ‘the Government have had no difficulty in maintaining law and order.’97 
 
Conclusion 
In their comparative study of Tanzania and Kenya in the first years after 
independence, Goran Hyden and Colin Leys concluded that elections were “peripheral to the 
main issues and course of politics” in both countries.98 This brisk dismissal suited their 
intention – a critique of what they called the Nuffield approach to electoral study, which they 
characterized as based on the assumption that elections offered a way into understanding 
politics as a whole. But the assertion perhaps obscures their further point – that elections were 
nonetheless an important part of political process. Citing Saul’s work on Tanzania, they 
suggested that elections granted “a disarming illusion of popular access to the centre of the 
system” while maintaining the status quo.99 That echoes the argument that a degree of choice 
over parliamentary representation reconciled the public to the overall exclusiveness of power, 
and so underwrote legitimacy in Kenya in these years: “elections counted in Kenya,” in 
Bienen’s words.100  
This article has argued that elections also underwrote legitimacy in a more basic way. 
The multiple rituals which led up the casting and counting of ballots asserted and performed 
– and drew people into – an association between peace and order, and a distinction between 
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authorized and unauthorized violence, that exalted the administration and naturalized the 
“selective use of coercion against disruptive elements” which has been identified as a 
characteristic of Kenyatta’s Kenya.101 When, as in 1966, violence was vulgarized and police 
or civil servants were complicit in disorderly violence, this legitimacy could be endangered; 
but more generally a Kenyan elite of senior civil servants and politicians cooperated to 
maintain and extend an imaginary division between “state” and “politics” which was acted 
out through elections. These performances of statehood were potentially risky. Even without 
parties, or within a single party, elections could be bitterly contested. They could also provide 
the opportunity for more or less explicit criticisms of local officials, or politicians – even, on 
occasion, for criticisms of the system itself. Vigorous local contests could lead to local 
violence, particularly if well-connected incumbents feared that they might lose; criticism of 
those who held power could provoke direct repression from officials unwilling to tolerate 
challenges to their own position, or the reputation of their superiors. Violence and direct 
repression threatened to blur the distinction between state and society: challenging the 
performed order of the election and disrupting its disciplinary power. But elections also 
offered a way to manage and obscure what Abrams calls the “actual disunity of political 
power”, which is concealed by the idea of the state.102 And so they were ultimately successful 
in drawing population and civil service into an enactment of the imagined distinction between 
state and society, which authorized certain forms of coercion and violence while 
delegitimising others – and maintained the political order. Their success was to shape the 
nature and practice of power in Kenya into the early twenty-first century. 
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